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DANGEROUS EXAMPLE OF REACTIONARY LEGISLATION
Jay Lechner
claimed to have been the first to free the mad
"The age ofpositivism ...
from a lamentable confusion with the felonious, to separate the innocence
of unreason from the guilt of crime. Yet it is simple enough to show the
vanity of this claim."'
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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 1995, nine-year-old Jimmy Ryce was abducted, raped, and
murdered 2 by a repeat sex offender' in South Florida.4 Ensuing lobbying
efforts by the child's parents5 compelled the Florida Legislature to enact the
Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators'
Treatment and Care Act ("Jimmy Ryce Act" or "Act") in 1998.6 The
Jimmy Ryce Act allows the state to commence involuntary civil
commitment proceedings 7 against an inmate near the end of his prison
sentence if the state can show that the inmate poses a "menace to the health
and safety of others."' In June 1997, the United States Supreme Court,
upheld as constitutional a similar 1994 Kansas statute, 9 but the Jimmy Ryce
Act and similar state statutes remain highly controversial."0 Nonetheless,
due in part to media attention over heinous crimes by sex offenders which
continue to rouse feelings of rage and hatred for such criminals," the

2. See Mari M. "Miki" Presley, Comment, Jimmy Ryce InvoluntaryCivil Commitmentfor
Sexually Violent Predators' Treatment and Care Act: Replacing CriminalJustice With Civil
Commitment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 488 (1999) (explaining that in September 1998, Juan
Carlos Chavez was convicted of the murder of Jimmy Ryce); Adam Chrzan, Jimmy Ryce Act Stalls
Sex Offender's Release, PRESS J. (Vero Beach), Feb. 21, 2000, at A3; Mike Schneider, Chavez
Convicted of Ryce Murder, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Sept. 19, 1998, at C5; Jimmy's Story
(visited Mar. 19, 2000)<http://www.jimmyryce.com/who we are/jimmystory.html>.
3. See Geoff Dougherty, Pasco Lawyers Challenging Ryce Act, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1999, Citrus Times, at 7. But see Jay Weaver, Measure Could Delay Release of Violent
Predators,SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Apr. 21, 1998, at B6 (stating that Chavez did not
have a previous record of violent sexual crimes).
4. See Michael Medaris, Jimmy Ryce Law Enforcement TrainingCenterProgram,OFF.OF
JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION (U.S. Dep't of Just/Off. of Juv. Just. & Delinq. Prevention,
Washington D.C.), Mar. 1997, at 1; Tom Bayles, Committee Approves Sex Offender Bill;
PredatorsWouldBe ForcedIntoTreatment, FLA. TIMEs-UNIoN (Jacksonville), Mar. 13, 1998, at
B4.
5. See Presley, supranote 2, at 488. The legislation was authorized by the victim's parents.
See id. Donald and Claudine Ryce's advocacy and input also prompted the federal Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, in conjunction with the F.B.I. and National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children, to establish the Jimmy Ryce Law Enforcement Training
Center, which was authorized by Congress by the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1996. See
Medaris, supra note 4, at 1.
6. See FLA. STAT. §§ 394.9135(3), .914 (1999).
7. See FLA. STAT. § 394.913(1) (1999).
8. FLA STAT. § 394.912(4) (1999).
9. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997). In Hendricks, the Court rejected
claims that the 1994 Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a0 I et seq.
(1994)) violated double jeopardy, ex post facto, and due process provisions. See id.
10. Kimberly A. Dorsett, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: Marking the Beginning of a
DangerousNew Era in Civil Commitment, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 113, 114 (1998).
11. See id. at 113; see also Ardy Friedberg, FreedSex Offender Charged'Again;Mother of

AMENDMEN'S TO TOE JIMMY RYCE ACT

Florida Legislature amended the Jimmy Ryce Act in 1999 to further restrict
protections provided inmates subject to the Act.' I These amendments, in
conjunction with original Jimmy Ryce Act provisions, raise serious
concerns as to the constitutionality of the statute's application.
The purpose of this note is to explore the procedures and underlying
policies of the Jimmy Ryce Act and its 1999 amendments and to analyze the
constitutionality of those procedures within the context of recent cases and
commentary. In part II, this note examines the procedures and underlying
policies of the 1998 Jimmy Ryce Act. Part II also examines how the 1999
amendments to the Act restrict evidentiary protections. Part III asserts that
due process concerns are implicated by the Jimmy Ryce Act's definition of
"mental abnormality," both due to the imprecision of the classification and
the classification's reliance on a respondent's past criminal acts. Part IV not
only discusses due process issues raised by the Act's reliance upon mental
health experts' predictions of dangerousness, but also the harm caused to
society by the statute's use of such criterion. Part V addresses
constitutional infirmities in the Jimmy Ryce Act's requirement that for an
individual to be designated a sexually violent predator, he must have been
previously convicted of a sexually violent offense.
Part VI examines the impact of the 1999 amendments to the Act upon
an inmate's due process rights, particularly in relation to restrictions on an
inmates's right to present and cross- examine witnesses and to restrictions
on an inmate's right to confidentiality. Part VII briefly explains how
procedural limitations also restrict challenges to the constitutionality of the
Jimmy Ryce Act. Part VIII suggests possible safeguards which, if
implemented, may minimize the risk of unwarranted involuntary
commitment. Because this issue is susceptible to considerable ambiguity
and political pressures, and because individuals' fundamental rights are at
stake, the Florida Legislature should, instead of removing evidentiary
protections for individuals subject to the Jimmy Ryce Act, seriously
consider implementing additional procedural safeguards.
II. PROCEDURES AND POLICIES OF THE JIMMY RYCE ACT
As AMENDED IN 1999

The Jimmy Ryce Act, as amended by the Florida Legislature in 1999,
directs the Secretary of Children and Family Services "or his or her
Victim, 11, Outraged She Was Not Told ofHis Background,SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Jan.
12, 2000, at IB (discussing the arrest of a sex offender who, while on probation, allegedly
attacked an I I year-old girl).
12. See STAFFOF SENATE COMM. ONCHILDREN AND FAMILIES, SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND

ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT I (Comm. Print 1999) (explaining that "substantive changes...
are designed to refine the implementation of the civil commitment process for sexually violent
predators at the state agency level and at the trial level").
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designee" 3 to establish a multidisciplinary team for the purpose of
recommending to the state attorney whether an inmate is a "sexually violent
predator."' 14 The Act defines a "sexually violent predator" as "any person
who: (a) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility
for long-term control, care, and treatment.""
The agency with jurisdiction 6 must, within 365 days 7 prior to releasing
an inmate convicted of a sexually violent crime, notify both the
multidisciplinary team and state attorney of the inmate's impending
release." The multidisciplinary team must include, but is not limited to,
"two licensed psychiatrists or psychologists or one licensed psychiatrist and
one licensed psychologist."' 9 The agency must provide the multidisciplinary
team with the inmate's records, including mental health records and the
inmate's criminal history.2" An inmate subject to the Act must be offered
a personal interview with at least one of the members of the
multidisciplinary team; however, if the inmate "refuses to fully
participate,"'" the team may proceed with its recommendation without a
personal interview.22 From these records and interviews, the team makes

13. See FLA. STAT. § 394.913(3) (1999). The 1998 Jimmy Ryce Act requires the Secretary
to establish the team. See FLA. STAT. § 916.33(3) (Supp. 1998). The 1999 statute does not restrict
to whom the Secretary may designate the authority to establish the multidisciplinary team. See
FLA. STAT. § 394.913(3) (1999).
14. ee FLA. STAT. § 394.913(3) (1999).
15. FLA. STAT. § 394.912(10) (1999).
16. The "agency with jurisdiction" is defined as "the agency that releases, upon lawful order
or authority, a person who is serving a sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections
....
" FLA. STAT. § 394.912(1) (1999).
17. See FLA. STAT. § 394.913(1) (1999). The 1998 Act required notice be given at least 180
days prior to anticipated release. See FLA. STAT. § 916.33(l) (Supp. 1998).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 394.913(1) (1999).
19. FLA. STAT. § 394.913(3)(b) (1999). The 1999 Act altered the 1998 requirements by
providing that the team may consist of more members than the two statutorily-required licensed
practitioners. See FLA. STAT. § 916.33(3) (Supp. 1998).
20. See FLA. STAT. § 394.913(2) (1999). The 1998 Act did not specifically mention mental
health or medical records, but instead provided for release of "[diocumentation of institutional
adjustment and any treatment received .... " See FLA. STAT. § 916.33(2)(b) (Supp.1998).
21. FLA. STAT. § 394.913(3)(c) (1999). The Act is unclear as to what actions by the
respondent would constitute a refusal "to fully participate." See id.
22. See id. Because the 1998 Act did not address this issue, courts were commonly faced
with the issue of whether a face-to-face evaluation was necessary. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM.
ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 12, at 16. One court actually dismissed a petition because
"the court found that face-to-face interviews were not conducted by both members of the
multidisciplinary team." Id. However, others argued that personal interviews should be an option,
determined in accordance with professional judgment. See id.

2000]

AMENDMEN7S TO THE JIMMY RYCE ACT

its recommendation as to whether the inmate is a "sexually violent
predator."2' 3
Prior to the inmate's release,24 and following receipt of the team's
recommendation, the state attorney25 may file a petition for commitment. 26
After the filing of a petition, a judge determines whether probable cause
exists to believe that the inmate is a "sexually violent predator." 27 The
judge's determination is made without an adversarial hearing; therefore, the
respondent is not entitled to be present and does not have a right to
counsel.2" Consequently, the only basis a judge generally has for making
this determination is the multidisciplinary team's report." Ifthejudge finds
probable cause, the inmate is immediately transferred to an "appropEriate
secure facility"3 during pendency of the commitment proceedings.
The Florida Legislature contemplated that these procedures would
occur prior to the inmate's anticipated release date.32 Nevertheless, the
1999 Act provides that if proceedings continue after the expiration of the
inmate's sentence, the court may decide an adversarial probable cause
hearing is necessary33 to determine if the inmate should be confined during
pendency of the trial.34 However, if the inmate caused the delay that
resulted in the failure to commence a trial before the expiration of his
sentence, the judge cannot consider holding an adversarial hearing."

23. See FLA. STAT. § 394.913(3)(b)-(c) (1999).

24. If the inmate is released from total confinement prior to filing of the petition, that person
is released to the Department of Children and Family Services. See FLA. STAT. § 394.9135(l)
(1999). The multidisciplinary team must, within 72 hours, determine whether that person is a
sexually violent predator. See FLA. STAT. § 394.9135(2) (1999). Thereafter, the state attorney may
file a petition for commitment within 48 hours of receipt of the team's findings. See FLA. STAT.
§ 394.9135(3) (1999).
25. A state attorney may not file a petition for involuntary civil commitment independent
of a recommendation from the multidisciplinary team. See 98 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (1998).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 394.914 (1999).
27. See FLA. STAT. § 394.915(l) (1999).
28. See id.
29. See generally Johnson v. Dep't of Children & Family Serv., 747 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla.
4th DCA 1999) (stating that an evaluation by a multidisciplinary team was the predicate in that
case for commencing confinement under the Act).
30. See FLA. STAT. § 394.915(1) (1999). The 1998 Act required that the inmate be held in
an "appropriate secure facility in the county where the petition was filed. . . ." See FLA. STAT. §
916.35(4) (Supp. 1998). The 1999 amended Act abandoned the requirement that the facility be
in the county in which the petition was filed and instead leaves the determination of
appropriateness to the Department of Children and Family Services. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM.
ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supranote 12, at 16.
31. See FLA. STAT. § 394.915(1) (1999).
32. See Valdez v. Moore, 745 So. 2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
33. See FLA. STAT. § 394.915(2) (1999).
34. See FLA. STAT. § 394.915(2)-(5) (1999).
35. See FLA. STAT. § 394.915(2) (1999). Under the terms of the statute, any delay caused
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If probable cause is found, and good cause is not shown for
continuance,3 6 a trial must begin within thirty days." At trial, although the
Florida rules of evidence and civil procedure generally apply,38 the 1999
amendments to the Act may greatly restrict an inmate's evidentiary
protections.39 First, the "psychotherapist-patient privilege under s. 90.503
does not exist or apply..
,40 Second, the 1999 amendments to the Act
allow the admissibility at trial ofhearsay41 and evidence ofprior behavior.42
Finally, ifthe inmate refuses to "fully cooperate" with the multidisciplinary
team, the court may prohibit his mental health experts from testifying about
the inmate's mental health examinations or evaluations.4 3
For the State to prove that an individual is a sexually violent predator
at trial, it must prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence."
First, the State must prove that the inmate has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense.45 Second, the State must establish that the inmate suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder." Third, the State must
demonstrate that the mental abnormality makes the inmate likely to engage
in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.47
If the court orjury find the inmate to be a sexually violent predator, the
inmate is then committed to the custody of the Department of Children and
Family Services,48 until such time as the inmate's mental abnormality or
personality disorder "has so changed that it is safe for the [inmate] to be at

by the respondent, regardless of the grounds for such protraction, would proscribe an adversarial
probable cause hearing. See id. This provision was found to violate a respondent's procedural due
process rights in Valdez, 745 So. 2d at 1012.
36. See FLA. STAT. § 394.916(2) (1999). The court may continue a trial upon the request of
either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of
justice.
37. See FLA. STAT. § 394.916(1) (1999). However, state requests for continuance have been
granted for reasons such as "administrative misrouting of the file." See Meadows v. Krischer, 763
So. 2d 1087, 1040-91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
38. See FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(1-2) (1999). See id.
39. See generally FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(1-2) (1999) (providing for the admissibility of

evidence that would otherwise be protected under general rules of evidence and procedure).
40. FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(3) (1999).
41. FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(5) (1999). Hearsay evidence is admissible under this part unless
the courts finds that such evidence is not reliable. See id.
42. See FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(4) (1999).
43. See FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(7)(b) (1999).
44. Standard Jury Instructions- Criminal Cases 99-2, No. SC-95832, 2000 WL 766602,
at *8 (Fla. June 15, 2000).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. While the individual must be maintained in a secure facility segregated from other
patients, see FLA. STAT. § 394.9 17(2) (1999), the statute provides that less restrictive alternatives
are not applicable to cases under the 1999 Act. See FLA. STAT. § 394.911 (1999).
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large." 49 A court makes this determination after an adversarial bench trial," °
which is held only if the judge determines that there is probable cause that
the inmate's condition has changed."'
III. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS REGARDING DEFINING
"MENTAL ABNORMALITY"

The Jimmy Ryce Act, like all involuntary civil commitment laws, raises
serious, albeit often amorphous, due process concerns.5 2 Confinement
pursuant to the Act constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty53 courts
have recognized that freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental 4
right.55 Under substantive due process analysis, when a state law infringes
upon a fundamental right, that state law must be a reasonable and
appropriate means for achieving the state's legitimate purpose.56
Along these lines, critical discussion regarding sexual predator
involuntary commitment laws, such as the Jimmy Ryce Act, has focused on
ambiguities in defining "mental abnormality" 7 and predicting
"dangerousness." 58 Such critical discussion presents a challenge to the use
of such definitions as an appropriate means for a state to protect its
citizenry.
A. Imprecisionof the Classification
Commentators have argued that the classification of mental abnormality
is too imprecise tojustify an individual's involuntary civil detention. 9 The
United States Supreme Court has established that, as a general rule, for a
state to involuntarily confine an individual in accordance with substantive

49.

FLA. STAT.

§ 394.917(2) (1999).

50. See FLA. STAT. § 394.918(4) (1999).
51. See FLA. STAT. § 394.918(3) (1999).
52. See Brian J. Pollock, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: A Workable Standardfor "Mental
Illness" or a Push Down the Slippery Slope TowardState Abuse of Civil Commitment?, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 319,320 (1998); Randolph Pendleton, When GoodLaws Go Bad; Lawmakers Sometimes
Shocked By Result of Bills, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville), Feb. 21, 2000, at Al (noting that

some attorneys have said that although the intent of the Jimmy Ryce Act was good, "legislators
failed to take into account the extensive court proceedings needed to ensure due process.").
53. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
54. Individual rights have been found to be fundamental where it is "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty [that]... neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
55. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
56. See Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Wyo. 1996).
57. See infra notes 59-114 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 126-63 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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due process, that individual must be both mentally ill and dangerous. 6° In
determining whether these elements have been satisfied, the Court closely
scrutinizes the procedural safeguards that are provided to an involuntary
committed individual.6' However, because the Court has generally given
great deference to the states regarding the substantive components of civil
commitment laws,6263 it has generally left the task of defining mental illness
to state legislators.
Hence, the Florida Legislature, pressing the boundaries of the Court's
deference, has provided that for an inmate to be confined under the Jimmy
Ryce Act, he must be found to suffer from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the inmate "likely to engage in acts of
sexual violence. . . ."4 The Florida Legislature defined "mental
abnormality" as "a mental condition affecting a person's emotional or
volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent
offenses."65 In 1997, the United States Supreme Court, in Kansas v.
Hendricks,66 found that such a definition satisfied the mental illness
requirement for involuntary commitment purposes.67
The rationale for the Court's deference as interpreted by the dissent in
Hendricks, was that "[t]he psychiatric debate.. . helps to inform the law
by setting the bounds of what is reasonable.. .,6. Yet, dispute continues
as to the appropriateness of employing unsettled mental health concepts as
a basis for applicable legal standards. 69 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy has
explained that evidentiary standards may not satisfy due process

60. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. InFoucha, the Court held that due process allows an
insanity acquittee to be incarcerated only as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no
longer. See id. at 77 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983)).
61. See Pollock, supranote 52, at 320-21.
62. See Pollock, supranote 52, at 321.
63. See id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997)). Although the
Hendricks Court dismissed Hendricks' substantive due process claim, the Court did not expressly
overrule Foucha. "Whether Foucha continues to have precedential value remains to be seen."

DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL.,

3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENcE: THE LAW AND SCIENcE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 36-.3.1, at 74-75 (Supp. 1999).

64. FLA. STAT. § 394.912(4)(10)(b) (1999).
65. FLA. STAT. § 394.912(5) (1999).
66. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
67. See id.at 350, 352. Kansas, in it's Sexually Violent Predator Act, defined "mental
abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such
person a menace to the health and safety of others." Id. at 352 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5929a02(b) (1994)). In Hendricks, the Court held that Kansas' definition satisfied substantive due
process requirements. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
68. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 375 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer continued, "but [the
Court] cannot here decide just how States must write their laws within those bounds." Id.
69. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.

AMENDMEN7S TO THE JIMMY RYCE ACT

requirements "if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a
category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified
,70

The Jimmy Ryce Act, as amended in 1999, jeopardizes evidentiary
standards because the Act's legal definition of "mental abnormality" is
based upon uncertain scientific concepts not accepted in the mental health
field. 7' This reliance upon tautological definitions inevitably leads to
ambiguity. 7" As a general rule, when a label is invoked to justify the
deprivation of a fundamental liberty the definition must be legal, not
clinical.73 For example, whether an inmate's proper diagnosis is "antisocial
personality disorder" is a factual question, but whether "antisocial
personality disorder" constitutes a mental illness sufficient to justify
commitment as a matter of substantive due process is a legal question.74
However, despite "[tlhere [being] virtually no psychological tests that were
designed for the purpose of measuring or assessing a legal issue,"75 the
Jimmy Ryce Act effectively combines the factual and legal questions. By
unsystematically creating the legal category "mental abnormality," and
assigning to mental health professionals the authority to define and
diagnose it, the Florida Legislature "has gone beyond the bounds of any
behavioral dysfunction recognized by mental health professionals and [has]
created a hopeless muddle. 76
Initially, it is important to recognize that reliance upon any scientific
concept inherently carries a certain level ofsubjectivity and ambiguity. 77 To
70. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Hendrickswas a 4-1-4 decision
with Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion being determinative. See id
71. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
72. See Presley, supra note 2, at 508-09.
73. See Bruce Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal MeaningandSignificanceofMentalIllness,
I PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 534 (1995), reprintedin MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 232,232 (Michael L. Perlin, ed., Carolina Academic Press 1999).
74. See id. at 234.
75. JAY ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 201 (3d ed.
1981).
76. John Q. La Fond, Washington'sSexually Violent PredatorsStatute: Law or Lottery? A
Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 755, 764 (1992) (interpreting the
Washington Sexually Violent Predator Act).
77. See generallyTHOMAS F. GIERYN, CULTURAL BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CREDIBILITY ON
THE LINE 343-43 (1999) (explaining how social factors play a role in creating the "constructed and
artifactual character" of science); BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION (1987) (describing how
scientific "truth" is in reality merely a stage in a process of negotiation and how chains of various
factors influence the determination of such "truth"). Inherent scientific unreliability contributed
to the United States Supreme Court's decision to require federal judges to analyze the reliability
of all scientific evidence when determining its admissibility at trial. James Robert Brown, Social
Factorsin Science, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 442,44243 (W.H. Newton
Smith ed., 2000) (summarizing how "our scientific beliefs are the result of various interests and
biases we possess that stem from our social situations); David C. Gooding, Experiment, in A
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an even greater extent, mental illness "is socially constructed, more
normative in character than descriptive." ' In a sense, "disease categories
and boundaries are not discovered but invented from among several
competing choices. . . ."" Historically, the confinement of the "mad"
significantly preceded attempts at classification of the causes and origins
underlying mental health symptoms8 0 As a result, labeling a condition as
a disease or disorder largely involves a value judgment.8 ' Because a
psychiatrist's interpretation is inherently subjective, a variety of influences
may affect any psychiatric determination. 2 Consequently, "subtleties and
nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach
in most situations." 3 Whether juries can deci her conflicting terms,
nuances, and influences remains open for debate.Not only is the process of disease classification and recognition "always
contingent on social factors," 5 but as Professor Lars Noah explains, "the
law and lawyers have [also] played a subtle, but often significant, role in
'framing disease.""'6 Professor Noah reveals how legal institutions do more
than passively accept medical disease classifications and particular

COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 117, 121-22 (W.H. Newton-Smith ed.,
2000)(describing how the "theory-ladenness" of scientific experimentation and processes of
scientific interpretation negatively affect perceptions of the empirical objectivity of such
experimentation). See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-95 (1993)
(suggesting that judges consider falsifiability, peer review, error rate, operational standards, and
general acceptance when determining reliability of scientific evidence).
78. Winick, supra note 73, at 232.
79. Lars Noah, PigeonholingIllness: MedicalDiagnosisas a Legal Construct,50 HASTINGS
L.J. 241, 251 (1999); see also ROBERT A. ARONOWITZ, MAKING SENSE OF ILLNESS: SCIENCE,
SOCIETY, AND DISEASE 10-15, 171 (1998) (explaining that "[tihe acts of disease recognition,
naming, and classification... are always contingent on social factors").
80. See FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 235. Only after moral transgressors and libertines were
no longer arbitrarily commixed with madmen for commitment purposes did any classification of
the causes and origins underlying mental health symptoms develop. See id. at 224; see also Noah,
supra note 79, at 250.
81. See Saul J.Faerstein, M.D.,Symposium on Mental DisabilityLaw: Sexually Dangerous
Predatorsand Post-Prison Commitment Laws, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 895, 898 (1998). Dr.
Faerstein explained that prior to 1987 before it was removed in part as a political act of American
Psychiatry, homosexuality was considered a mental disorder by the psychiatric community. See
id. He elaborated that "[i]t
is still unclear whether a sexual attraction to children or other
alteration of sexual object choice is determined by biology or by early life experience." Id.
82. See LEE COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR 4 (1972).
83. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979).
84. See infra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
85. ARONOWITZ, supranote 79, at 171.
86. Noah, supra note 79, at 252 (quoting Janet A. Tighe, The Legal Art of Psychiatric
Diagnosis: Searchingfor Reliability, in FRAMING DISEASE: STUDIES IN CULTURAL HISTORY
(Charles E. Rosenber et al. eds. 1992)).
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diagnoses which were actually intended for therapeutic purposes.87 Instead,
"legal institutions influence both nosology and diagnosis.""8 In essence, law
and medicine are mutually constitutive and co-dependent, with the legal
profession acting as a force shaping the mental health and medical disease
classification processes.89
The development of sexual predator involuntary commitment statutes,
including the Jimmy Ryce Act, exemplify this co-dependency phenomenon.
Prior to the current proliferation in sexually violent predator laws, the
categorization process projected by the Jimmy Ryce Act lacked clinical
validity. 90 In fact, "mental abnormality" was not a recognized diagnostic
term, but rather was "simply a description of the causation of any
behavior. ' Therefore, the category "mental abnormality" is not
synonymous with mental illness, but rather, is merely a legislatively-created
term that fails to take into account evidentiary standards required to
properly diagnose mental illness. 92 Consequently, the Florida Legislature,
by enacting the Jimmy Ryce Act, essentially created a broad legal category
and then, after the fact, assigned to psychiatric professionals the
responsibility of defining and diagnosing it. Whether this interconnected
classification scheme constitutes a reasonable and appropriate means under
the Due Process Clause should be given serious consideration.
B. FairnessIssues in the DiagnosisProcess
Jimmy Ryce Act provisions directing the multidisciplinary team's
diagnosis process may further contribute to potential ambiguities and
inaccuracies because, ultimately, such provisions may allow mental health
experts to diagnose inmates as having a mental abnormality based solely
upon the inmates' criminal acts. Commentators have observed that under
the Act, a finding of a mental abnormality "flows almost inexorably from a
conviction for a violent sex offense; 93 therefore, use of "mental

87. See id. at 253.
88. Id.at 288.
89. See id.
90. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS § 7.05,
at 179 (1987) (citing GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX
PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION THE 30s TO THE 80S,at 935 (1977)). This study concluded that the
assumption that a "hybrid amalgam of law and psychiatry can validly label a person a 'sex
psychopath' or 'sex offender' and then treat him is rejected as analogous to creating special
categories of 'burglary offender' statutes or 'white collar' offender statutes." Id.
91. Dorsett, supra note 10, at 140 (quoting Stephen J. Morse, Blame andDanger:AnEssay
ofPreventative Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113, 137 (1996)).
92. See Dorsett, supra note 10, at 140.
93. In re Samuelson, 727 N.E. 2d 228, 239 (I11.
2000) (Heiple, J., dissenting).
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abnormality" is a "'pure tautology, conflating both diagnosis and prediction
with a single incident of criminal behavior."' 94
For example, in In re Samuelson,95 the Illinois Supreme Court, applying
a similar statute,96 accepted a mental health expert's diagnosis as
establishing probable cause that an inmate subject to involuntary civil
commitment suffered from pedophilia.9" The expert relied upon the
following two criteria: 1) the inmate had engaged in sexual activity with
children over longer than a six-month period, and 2) the inmate continued
his behavior despite personal and criminal consequences.9" Thus, the expert
was able to diagnose the inmate as "having a 'mental disorder' within the
meaning of the Act solely by virtue of defendant's having committed the
acts which led to his criminal conviction andpunishment."99 Ultimately,
however, the court upheld the statute in part because the inmate "did not
cite any authority to support a finding that due process [had] been
violated."' 00
Jimmy Ryce 'Act procedures also make it likely that the
multidisciplinary team will diagnose inmates as having a mental abnormality
based solely upon inmates' criminal acts. Notably, ajudge's determination
of probable cause that an inmate is a "sexually violent predator" is usually
made without an adversarial hearing, therefore the inmate is not entitled to
be present and does not have a right to counsel.' Instead, the only basis
the judge generally has for determining probable cause is the report
provided by the multidisciplinary team."°2 Consequently, the team's report
"assumes great significance for the confinement of [the inmate] under the
Act.' 0 3 Thus, the report's reliability is essential for an inmate to receive a
fair proceeding. " One procedure that would appear to ensure the report's

94. Dorsett, supra note 10, at 141 (quoting La Fond, supranote 76, at 764). La Fond argued
that because the term is vague and easily distorted, legislatures may easily abuse or misapply it
in the civil commitment system. See id.
95. 727 N.E. 2d 228 (Ill. 2000).
96. Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1 (West
1998).
97. See Samuelson, 727 N.E. 2d at 239 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
98. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 237.
101. See id.
102. See generally Johnson v. Dep't of Children & Family Serv., 747 So. 2d 402, 403 (4th
DCA 1999).
103. Id. In Johnson, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that despite the broad
purpose of the Jimmy Ryce Act to protect the public, "the continued confinement of a person after
he has served his full sentence... is serious enough to warrant scrupulous compliance with the
statute permitting such confinement, not to mention the applicable constitutional provisions." Id.
104. See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ETAL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 7-1.3, at 294 (1997).
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reliability is allowing face-to-face interviews between the inmate and the
multidisciplinary team members."0 Justice Douglas, applying this rationale,
implored that "[t]he use ofcircuit-riding doctors who never see or examine
claimants ...should be beneath the dignity of a great nation."" °6
Despite Douglas' admonition, in most cases under the Jimmy Ryce Act,
the multidisciplinary team, in composing its report, relies solely upon a
paper record review to evaluate and assess the inmate.' 0" As seen in
Samuelson, this form of review raises questions regarding the basis of the
team's diagnosis.'0 8 Although courts analyzing the 1998 Jimmy Ryce Act
required both multidisciplinary team members to conduct face-to-face
interviews,"° 9some team members opined that personal interviews were not
needed to evaluate individuals subject to the Act."0 Accordingly, the 1999
amendments to the Act specifically provide that if an inmate "refuses to
fully participate in a personal interview, the multidisciplinary team may
proceed with its recommendation without a personal interview."'" This
form of multidisciplinary analysis can only aggravate the inherent
inaccuracies in diagnosing "mental abnormality."
In Hendricks, deference to state definitions of mental abnormality
presented little difficulty for the Court because Hendricks was diagnosed
with a widely recognized mental disorder, and he admitted that he could not
control his dangerous impulses if not confined to a secure facility.1 2 Under
the Jimmy Ryce Act, however, the probability of conflict between legal and
mental standards is much greater than implicated by Hendricks because the
facts of an individual case will rarely satisfy the requirements of mental
illness and dangerousness so clearly."' Even if the Jimmy Ryce Act is
construed as constitutional based upon its similarities to the Hendricks
statute, the 1999 amendments to the Act undermine individual procedural
and evidentiary protections to the extent that due process is seriously
impinged.'

105. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 12, at 16.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 12, at 16.
See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 12, at 16.

110. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 12, at 16.

111. FLA. STAT. § 394.913(3)(c) (1999).

112. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997). The Hendricks Court interpreted
"mental abnormality" as synonymous with "lack of volitional control." See id. at 358-60.
113. See generally Editorial, Ryce Act Too Broad, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, November 24,
1999, at 14A. See also FAIGMAN, supra note 63, at 76 (explaining that "[sltates are unlikely to
find many cases as easy as Hendricks to prove that a person has no volitional control.").
114. See infra notes 180-225 and accompanying text.
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IV. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS REGARDING
PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS

The United States Supreme Court has established that a "finding of
'mental illness' alone cannotjustify a state's locking a person up against his
will and keeping him indefinitely in. . .confinement."" Hence, the First
District Court of Appeal of Florida has found that for involuntary
commitment to satisfy substantive due process, an inmate must pose "a real
and present threat of substantial harm to himself or others." ' 6 Therefore,
a non-dangerous inmate, capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself
' 17
or with the help of others, "should never be involuntarily committed.
Furthermore, it generally "is not sufficient that the state establish a
possibility that [a] defendant might commit some dangerous acts at some
time in the indefinite future. [Rather, t]he risk of danger... must be
substantial within the reasonably foreseeable future."" 8
Additionally, a court's determination of an inmate's dangerousness must
involve an actual prediction of that inmates future conduct, not a mere
characterization of his past conduct." 9 This determination is "ultimately a
legal one, not a medical one,"'"2 and involves a balancing of societal
interests against the inmate's interest in personal liberty and autonomy.
Thus, a court may use medical testimony to assist in its decision-making,

115. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
116. Braden v. State, 575 So. 2d 756, 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In Braden, the court found
that a person could not be involuntarily committed, even though he was verbally and physically
aggressive toward others, unpredictable, and in need of a structured environment with supervision,
where experts did not identify the serious nature of injury that would occur if he were not
incarcerated, did not present any testimony of serious injuries as a result of past episodes, and
where the person could survive safely outside involuntary placement without being a threat to
himself or others. See id.
117. Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 983,984 (Fla. Ist DCA 1988); see also Lyon v. State, 724
So. 2d 1241, 1241-42 (Fla. Ist DCA 1999) (finding that involuntary commitment of an alleged
schizophrenic, on the ground that she was likely to suffer from refusal to care for herself, was not
warranted, absent a specific showing that any self-neglect posed real and present threat of
substantial harm to her well-being).
118. New Jersey v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 302 (N.J. 1975). The Supreme Court is hesitant to
sanction civil detention based upon a finding of dangerousness alone, without an attendant
justification that strengthens the case for such detention, such as a finding that the detainee is
dangerous and unable to control himself. See id; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358
(1997) (requiring for civil commitment additional requirement of mental illness); Hermanowski
v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 161 (D.R.I. 1999) (finding that "the government's
determination that an individual is a danger to the community is, by itself, an insufficient basis
for detaining that individual indefinitely.").
119. See Krol, 344 A.2d at 302. However, past conduct is evidence as to an individual's
future conduct. See id.
120. Id
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but the court's decision must ultimately be based upon its resolution of the
legal issue. 2 '
The Jimmy Ryce Act incorporates the due process dangerousness
requirement by providing that the inmate must be "likely to engage in acts
of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control,
care, and treatment."'" The Florida Legislature has defined "likely to
engage in acts of sexual violence" to mean that the inmate's "propensity to
commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to
the health and safety of others."'2 This element of the Jimmy Ryce test is
potentially even more susceptible to constitutional criticism than the
"mental abnormality" requirement. 24 While the Florida Legislature's
definition has been challenged on vagueness grounds," 5 this note will only
address the due process concerns raised by the Act's element of
dangerousness.' 26
A Use of CriterionHarmful to Society and Individual
The Act's definition of dangerousness, like that of "mental abnormality," may fail to meet the standards accepted by the Florida Legislature
for involuntary commitment because the Act's definition of dangerousness
merely requires the state to establish a possibility that an inmate may
commit some dangerous acts at some time in the indefinite future.'27 The
Act fails to comply with traditional involuntary commitment precedent and
provide that the risk of danger be substantial within the reasonably
foreseeable future.' 28 Therefore, this provision of the Act may violate
substantive due process.'29

121. See id
122. FLA. STAT. § 394.912(10)(b) (1999).
123. FLA. STAT. § 394.912(4) (1999).
124. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY § 1.03 (1994),
reprintedin MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supranote 73, at 101 (explaining
that "[n]o question in the area of the involuntary civil commitment process has proven to be more
perplexing than the definition of the word 'dangerousness'....").
125. See Dougherty, supra note 3, at 7. In Pasco County, lawyers argued the word "likely"
was dangerously vague because jurors would not be able to determine the word's meaning within
the context of involuntary commitment proceedings. See id. This argument was ultimately rejected
by the trial court because, based on the statute's clarifying definition, the jury would be unlikely
to misinterpret the word. See GeoffDougherty, Judge rejectsRyce Act challenge, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1999, Pasco Times, at 1. Judge W. Lowell Bray, Jr. did however say he would
consider further challenges based on the Legislature's definition. See id
126. See infra notes 127-64.
127. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
128. See id.

129. See id.
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Furthermore, a court should use experts in human behavior to assist it
in determining dangerousness only where proper procedural mechanisms
are in place that limit expert testimony solely to the likelihood of future
dangerous activity.130 Professor Christopher Slobogin has noted that
commentators oppose the use of dangerousness as a legal criterion on two
major grounds.1" First, use of a dangerousness criterion asjustification for
protection of the public harms both the individual and society. 32 Second,
prediction of dangerousness is too inaccurate to be relied upon where
deprivation of liberty is at stake.' 33
Use of a dangerousness criterion as justification for protection of the
public harms both society and the individual. The Jimmy Ryce Act, as well
as other "sexually violent predator" involuntary commitment laws, reflects
and perpetuates public stereotypes ofpeople with psychiatric conditions.'4
Commentators have noted that the public, encouraged by media
sensationalism, justifies its fear and rejection of the "mentally ill," and
therefore, segregates the mentally
ill from the community by a collective
' 35
assumption of "dangerousness.'
As a result, when individuals realize that they may be confined for their
status, thoughts, or speculative future conduct, rather than for their actual
behavior, the moral tone of society may coincide with a curtailment of
respect for the legal system136 Furthermore, some have argued that
preventively detaining an inmate for something that he has not yet done will
not only fail to benefit that person, but will also increase the likelihood of
recidivism by convincing him of his inevitable incorrigibility and by
lessening his respect for the system. 137 As a result, any balancing of
interests must include recognition of the public concern for limiting
involuntary commitment.
130. See Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness as a Criterion in the Criminal Process, in
LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER 360,377-79 (Bruce Sales & Daniel Shuman eds.,
1st ed. 1996); see also Dorsett, supra note 10, at 142 n.271.
131. See Slobogin, supra note 130, at 365.
132. See Slobogin, supra note 130, at 365.
133. See Slobogin, supra note 130, at 365.
134. See John Monahan & Jean Arnold, Violence By Peoplewith MentalIllness:A Consensus
Statement by Advocates andResearchers, 19 PSYCHIATRICREHABILITATION J. 67, 68 (1996). The
authors found that a combination of factors, including media sensationalism, public misuse of
psychiatric terms, and exploitation of narrow stereotypes in the entertainment industry, has caused
'mental disorder' and violence to remain closely related in the public mind. See id at 68-69.
135. See id.at 68. One study concluded that sex offender statutes in fact serve primarily to
reassure the community of its own safety. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 90, § 7.05, at 179.
136. See Slobogin, supra note 130, at 366.
137. See Slobogin, supra note 130, at 365-66 (citing E. Zamble & F. Porporino, Coping,
Imprisonment andRehabilitation, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 53, 59 (1990)). But see Westerheide
v. State, 767 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (Finding that "predictions of dangerousness are
sufficiently accurate and reliable to be admissible.").
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B. Predictionof Dangerousnessis Inaccurate
A prediction of dangerousness may be too inaccurate to be relied upon
where deprivation of liberty is at stake. 3 However, in Barefoot v.
Estelle'" the United States Supreme Court found that predictions of
dangerousness are constitutional, at least where ordinary rules of evidence
are in place to ensure the fact-finder "the benefit of cross-examination and
contrary evidence by the opposing party."'" The Court reasoned that
because it had previously accepted lay persons' ability to predict
dangerousness, 4 "it makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists
...
would know
so little about the subject that they should not be permitted
14
testify."
to
The Barefoot Court assumed that experts are better than lay jurors at
predicting violence.143 However, ifthey are not, then, as some have argued,
an expert's testimony "has no probative value and should be excluded on
that basis alone."'" Yet, the Court placed its faith in the adversary process
45
to ensure that unreliable predictions would not unduly influence a jury.
Nevertheless, under the 1999 amendments to the Act, evidentiary
protections are restricted to such an extent that expert predictions of
dangerousness may effectively usurp the jury's decision-making role. 46
The Barefoot Court's assumption of expert reliability regarding
predictability of dangerousness has come under intense scrutiny by
researchers and commentators. 4 7 For example, one study conducted in
1987 found a mere thirty-three percent accuracy rate for predictions of
dangerousness by mental health professionals. 48 Douglass Mossman, in a

138. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,428 (1983) (Blachmun, J. dissenting) (explaining
that because psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are not accurate, "[ilt
is difficult to
understand how the admission of such predictions can be justified as advancing the search for
truth, particularly in light of their clearly prejudicial effect").
139. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
140. Id.at 898. Barefoot, however, predated Daubert,which at least in the federal system
requires that scientific evidence be reliable and relate directly to the issues and facts so that it can
be truly helpful to the trier of fact. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589

(1993).
141. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976).

142. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896-97.
143. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 103, § 7-1.3, at 294.
144. Id.
145. See id
146. See infra notes 177-222 and accompanying text.
147. See John Monahan, The Scientific Status of Research on Clinical and Actuarial
Predictions of Violence, inFAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 103, § 7-2.2, at 316-17.
148. See Dorsett, supra note 10, at 143 (referring to Michael Tonry, Prediction and
Classification: Legal and Ethical Issues, 9 CRIME & JUST. 367, 395 (1987)).
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study published seven years later, determined that "clinicians are able to
distinguish violent from nonviolent patients with a modest, better-thanchance level of accuracy."' 4 9 In fact, so inaccurate are such predictions,
"[iut has become a truism of the mental health professions and the mental
health bar that clinicians are unable to predict violent behavior."' 50
However, Professor Slobogin noted that although the absolute accuracy of
most predictions of dangerousness was low, their relative accuracy, in
relation to that of other prediction methods, was not as unimpressive."'
An additional concern is that often state mental health experts will rely
on statistical tables to assist in making predictions of dangerousness.'52
Professor Slobogin's observation illustrates the now recognized weaknesses
in the use of statistics for evidentiary purposes.13 For example, "[c]ourts
have legitimately feared that statistics might be employed as a way 'to
assign a number to the probability of guilt or innocence.'" 4 Consequently,
courts have held that statistical evidence must generally rest on an adequate
factual basis and, even then, a court must consider whether the potential for
jury confusion substantially outweighs the minimal probative value of such
evidence.' 5 For instance, the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida has
upheld the use of statistical evidence on the condition that it does not
circumscribe the jury's freedom to disregard or disbelieve expert witness
testimony. 56 That court found that defense counsel's right to subject
expert witnesses to vigorous cross-examination was an important safeguard
for ensuring such freedom."57
However, due to the 1999 amendments to the Act and the recognized
invalidity of statistical projections of dangerousness, it is highly probable
thatjuries will misconstrue State expert predictions and, as a result, commit

149. Douglass Mossman, AssessingPredictionsofViolence: BeingAccurateAboutAccuracy,
62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 783, 790 (1994). Mossman's conclusion appears to
represent the consensus view. See Monahan, supra note 147.
150. MELTON ETAL., supra note 90, § 8.08, at 236.
151. See Christopher Slobogin, DangerousnessandExpertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 111-13
(1984).
152. See generally Susan Spencer-Wendel, 1st County Man Held Under Ryce Act, PALM
BEACH POST, Feb. 25, 2000, at IC (citing a doctor who testified that Tywaun Jackson, a
respondent in a Jimmy Ryce Act proceeding, "scored very high on tables used to gauge a sex
offender's chances of offending again").
153. See generally Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precisionand Ritual in the
Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971) (concluding that the utility of mathematical
methods in the trial process has been greatly exaggerated).
154. Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694,696 (5th Fla. DCA 1989) (quoting People v. Collins,
438 P.2d 33, 40 (Cal. 1968)).
155. See People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 38-39 (Cal. 1968).
156. See Martinez, 549 So. 2d at 696-97.
157. See id. at 697.
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non-dangerous individuals."' Hence, if a multidisciplinary team relies on
statistical projections, the court should demand that such projections be
based upon an adequate evidentiary foundation and upon adequate proof
of statistical independence.
The Hendricks decision fails to offer guidance regarding the
uncertainties associated with predictions of violence. 59 Rather in
interpreting the Kansas statute, the Court asserted that the "dangerousness"
prong requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior. 6 ° A paradoxical
result of this interpretation is that the only prerequisite for satisfying the
6
dangerousness requirement is a showing of an inmate's past crimes.' '
However, prior convictions are not required by due process.16 1 In fact, "a
prior conviction requirement would be theoretically inconsistent with the
Court's conclusion that the Kansas statute does not violate the Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses [because] [c]ommitting only those
previously' convicted might suggest that the legislature's intent was
punitive.,' 63

V. PRIOR CONVICTION FOR A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE

The Jimmy Ryce Act requires that, to be subject to its provisions, an
inmate must have been convicted of a sexually violent offense.'" A
"sexually violent offense" may be based on a lewd, lascivious, or indecent

158. See Collins, 438 P.2d at 37-38.
159. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 63, § 36-1.3. 1, at 77.
160. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,357 (1997), quoted in FAIGMAN ETAL., supra note
63, § 36-1.3.1, at 78.
161. See FAIGMAN ETAL., supra note 63, § 36-1.3.1, at 78; Dorsett, supra note 10, at 144.
162. See id

163. Id.The Court upheld the Kansas statute as nonpunitive. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
368-71. Applying reasoning similar to that used in Hendricks, the Eleventh Circuit has found that
"'only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." Cole v. United States Dep't of Agric., 133
F.3d 803, 806 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)). In
Hendricks, the Court found;

[w]here the State has "disavowed any punitive intent"; limited confinement to a
small segment of particularly dangerous individuals; provided strict procedural
safeguards; directed that confined persons be segregated from the general prison
population and afforded the same status as others who have been civilly
committed; recommended treatment if such is possible; and permitted immediate
release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerous or mentally
impaired, we cannot say that it acted with punitive intent.

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69.
164. See FLA. STAT. § 394.912(10)(a) (1999).
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assault upon or in the presence of a child, or on a sexual battery. 165
Additionally, a conviction of murder, kidnapping, or false imprisonment
engaged in during the commission of sexual battery may also constitute a
predicate offense.'66 An attempt, conspiracy, or criminal solicitation of a
predicate crime also constitutes a sexually violent offense, as well as any
criminal act that was found beyond a reasonable doubt to have been
sexually motivated. 167
While these requisites may appear relatively innocuous, many lawyers
have argued that such "eligibility criteria are too open-ended and
indiscriminate," thereby rendering the Act overbroad. 68 A law is void on
its face as overbroad if it "does not aim specifically at evils within the
allowable area of state control but . . . sweeps within its ambit other
activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise . . ." of
protected rights. 69 The focus of overbreadth arguments is that the Florida
Legislature did not limit the necessary time interval between the occurrence
of the sexually violent offense and the filing of a petition for commitment
under the Act."" Consequently, if an inmate has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense at any time in his past, the state may file a petition
against that inmate, even if his current sentence is not being served for a
conviction of a sexually violent offense. 7 ' For example, a Hillsborough
County man was involuntarily committed under the Act at the end of a
prison term served "for something completely unrelated to sex: dealing in
stolen property.""'2 His previous sex crimes having occurred more than a
decade earlier, the man had "served his time for those crimes long before
the Ryce law was enacted.""'
This lack of temporal restriction for predicate offenses has contributed
to "four times as many convicts as first predicted [being] targeted as
candidates.. . " for involuntary commitment under the Act. 74 Moreover,
basing an inmate's commitment upon acts he committed in the distant past
is inconsistent with the Act's rationale that for such individuals, "the

165. See FLA. STAT. § 394.912(9) (1999).
166. See id.
167. See id.

168. See Editorial, supra note 112, at 14A. Even Jimmy Ryce's parents have voiced concerns
that the eligibility criteria are too open-ended. See id.
169. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
170. See FLA. STAT. § 394.912(9) (1999).
171. See Editorial, supra note 112, at 14A.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.Due to anticipated increases in petitions filed for involuntary commitment under the
Act, the Florida Supreme Court anticipated the growth in total number of civil trials in the circuit
courts would range from 8 to 13 percent. See In re Certification of the Need for Additional Judges,
728 So. 2d 730, 734 (Fla. 1999).
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likelihood of [them] . . .engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual
violence is high."""5 Therefore, this provision of the Act sweeps within its
ambit inmates whom were not its intended targets and whom may not
present a threat to public safety. 76

VI. 1999 AMENDMENTS TO EVIDENTIARY PROTECTIONS
The fact that the final determination of whether the inmate is a sexually
violent predator is made by a trial court' does not save the statute from
unconstitutionality. Courts have held that where a statute permits
psychiatric or medical reports to usurp the function of the trial court in
making its final determination, that statute may contravene the due process
clause.'
Under the Act, not only is the multidisciplinary team's report
disproportionately relied upon by the court in determining probable cause,
but also normal evidentiary protections are so eroded by the 1999
amendments that the multidisciplinary team's report ultimately usurps the
jury's function in making a final determination.
A Right to Presentand Cross-Examine Witnesses
Injury trials, the determination of factual questions is a unique function
of the jury."7" The existence of a jury demands rigorous guarantees of
accuracy; hence, rules of evidence have evolved. ' 10 A basic tenet of
evidence law is the right of a party to present and cross-examine
witnesses.''
The 1999 amendments to the Act severely restrict these basic
evidentiary rights where an inmate "refuses to be interviewed by or fully
cooperate with members of the multidisciplinary team or any state mental
health expert."'8 2 In such a case, the Act allows the court, in its discretion,
to prohibit the inmate's mental health experts from testifying concerning the
inmate's mental health tests, evaluations, or examinations.'
Notably,
because the Act fails to elaborate upon what circumstances may represent

175. FLA. STAT. § 394.910 (1999).
176. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
177. See FLA. STAT. § 394.917(l) (1999).
178. See Hightower v. State, 343 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Hill v. State, 251
N.E.2d 429, 437 (Ind. 1969).
179. See JOHN WILLIAM STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDEN CE § 328, at 548 (4th ed.
1992).
180. See id.
181. See CHRISTOPHER MUELLER& LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 300, at 360
(2d ed. 1994).
182. FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(7) (1999).
183. FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(7)(b) (1999).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 12

an inmate's refusal to "fully cooperate,"'"M the multidisciplinary team could
possibly be given full discretion to make that determination.
Furthermore, courts have generally held that the Fifth Amendment does
not apply to civil commitment."' 5 Therefore, although commentators have
contended that ethical and strategic issues, as well as the nature of the
adversarial commitment process, mandate that a right to silence should
proscribe an inmate from being compelled to submit to an evaluation, an
inmate may be compelled to be a witness against himself. 8 6 Consequently,
an inmate may be presented with two equally undesirable alternatives: either
fully comply with the multidisciplinary demands for fear ofbeing found not
to have "fully cooperate[d]," or go to trial without the testimony of expert
witnesses." 7 Either option, coupled with the fact that inmates in Jimmy
Ryce proceedings can be questioned by prosecutors at trial,' leads to
limitations on an inmate's standard evidentiary protections.'89
B. ConfidentialityIssues
The Jimmy Ryce Act, as amended in May, 1999, eliminated an inmate's
privilege to maintain his mental health communications and records
confidential. The psychotherapist-patient privilege, accepted by the United
States Supreme Court in Jaffe v. Redmond," protects "statements made
in confidence to a psychotherapist for purposes of treatment."' 9' The
rationale for the privilege is to benefit society by encouraging disclosure to
psychotherapists and by protecting privacy. "zThe Court has explained that
for this purpose to be served, "the participants in the confidential
conversation 'must be able to predict with some degree of certainty
whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying
applications
' 93
by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.""9

184. FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(7) (1999).
185. See, e.g., French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1360 (M.D.N.C. 1977), af'd,443
U.S. 901 (1979).
186. See MELTON E7 AL., supra note 88, § 8.09, at 239.
187. See FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(7) (1999).
188. See John Pacenti, Judge: Sex Offender Can Be Questioned in Ryce Hearing, PALM
BEACH POST, Feb. 5, 2000, at lB. The ruling was made in the case of Tywaun Jackson, a Palm
Beach County man who challenged the constitutionality of the Jimmy Ryce Act, on due process
grounds. See id.
189. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
190. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
191. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 349 (1997).
192. See id.
193. Jaffe, 518 U.S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
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Florida courts have recognized the significant public interest underlying
the privilege. 94 Additionally, due to "the dangers of lenient disclosure and
the availability of broad pretrial discovery," a party must generally "satisfy
a stringent test to justify [even] in camera disclosure of privileged
matters."'"' Accordingly, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida
has found that to obtain in camera review of confidential communications
or records, a party "must first establish a reasonable probability that the
privileged matters contain material information necessary to his defense.""'
Nonetheless, the Jimmy Ryce Act, as amended in 1999, provides a
broad, unconditional exception to confidentiality ofmental health records.
For instance, "(t)he psychotherapist-patient privilege under [§] 90.503 does
not exist or apply for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings
to involuntarily commit a person under this part."' Furthermore, "(t)he
agency with jurisdiction shall provide the multidisciplinary team with...
mental health, mental status, and medical records, including all clinical
records and notes concerning the person;.
",98 For cases where records
have been reviewed by the multidisciplinary team prior to the 1999
amendments to the Act, determining the law in effect at the time requires
interpretation of the statutory language of the 1998 Jimmy Ryce Act, which
if ambiguous, may demand interpretive guidance from legislative intent.99
Applying this analysis, it can be argued that the 1998 Jimmy Ryce Act
also allows the release of all medical, psychological, and psychiatric records
to the multidisciplinary team for the purpose of evaluation and prosecution
under the Act. For instance, Florida Statutes addressing Department of
Corrections policy state that;
Except as otherwise provided by law or in this section, the
following records and information of the Department of
Corrections are confidential and exempt from the provisions
of § 119.07(1) and § 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution:
(a) Mental health, medical, or substance abuse records of an
inmate or an offender....

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See, e.g., State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
Id.
Id
FLA. STAT. § 394.9155(3) (1999).
FLA. STAT. § 394.913(2) (1999).
See City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1983).
FLA. STAT. § 945.10(1) (1999) (proscribing release of inmate records that are in the

possession of the Department of Corrections). While rules promulgated by the Department of
Corrections (D.O.C.) pursuant to § 945.10(4) more specifically proscribe release of inmate mental
health and medical records, another D.O.C. rule provides that "[o]ther persons may review
medical records... as provided by law." FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 33-6.006(6)(a) (1999).
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Whether the 1998 Jimmy Ryce Act provides an exception to
confidentiality under these laws is ambiguous. The 1998 Jimmy Ryce Act
required that specified information be provided to the multidisciplinary
team, including "[d]ocumentation of institutional adjustment and any
treatment received... ."20 Yet, the phrases "institutional adjustment" and
"treatment" could be narrowly construed as excluding mental health
records.2 In interpreting this ambiguity, a court would likely apply the
rule of statutory construction that "[t]he provisions of statutes enacted in
the public interest should be given a liberal construction in favor of the
public."2 3 The Jimmy Ryce Act was clearly enacted to further the public
interest.2 4
Furthermore, 1999 amendments may reflect the Florida Legislature's
original intent to allow release of records under the 1998 provisions. While
as a general rule, when a statute is amended
one may assume... that the legislature intended the amended
statute to have a -meaning different from that accorded it
before the amendment,... mere statutory change of language
does not necessarily indicate an intent to change the law, for
the intent may be to clarify what was doubtful and to
safeguard against misapprehension as to existing law.20 5
Accordingly, in construing a statute, a court should consider amendments
as a clarification of original legislative intent and not as substantive
206
change.
. Here, legislative history indicates that the 1999 amendments to the Act
were either "technical changes," intended "to refine the implementation of
the civil commitment process... "or were simply designed to "clarifiy]
provisions of the law where it was determined that prior legislative intent
was ambiguous. 20 7 Accordingly, legislative history and statutory context
indicate that relevant 1999 amendments merely served to clarify the original
Act; therefore, ambiguous language should be interpreted as consistent with

201. FLA. STAT. § 916.33(2)(b) (Supp. 1998).
202. See id.

203. Department of Envtl. Reg. v. Goldring, 477 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1985).
204. FLA. STAT. § 916.41(1) (1998) provides that "(i)n order to protect the public, relevant
information and records that are otherwise confidential or privileged shall be released to the
agency having jurisdiction or to the state attorney for the purpose of... determining whether a
person is or continues to be a sexually violent predator."
205. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 541 So. 2d 1297, 1299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
206. See Palma Del Mar Condo. Ass'n No. 5 v. Commercial Laundries, 586 So. 2d 315, 317
(Fla. 1991); Lincoln v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 643 So. 2d 668, 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
207. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 12, at 1.

AMENDMEN'S TO THE JIMMYRYCE ACT

language in the 1999 amendments to the Act allowing for admissibility of
mental health records in commitment proceedings.
Regardless, the 1999 amendments to the Act would most likely apply
retroactively." 8 While, as a general rule, principles of statutory
construction demand a presumption against retroactivity, this presumption
"generally does not apply to 'remedial" 9 legislation."1 ° "[R]ather,
whenever possible, such legislation should be applied to pending cases in
order to fully effectuate the legislation's intended purpose."2tn Accordingly,
the 1999 amendments were remedial in that, not only was the Act intended
to protect the public, 212 but the amendments were also designed to correct
existing law by refining the implementation of the civil commitment process
and by clarifying provisions of the law where it was determined that prior
legislative intent was ambiguous. 1 3 Consequently, Florida law allows for
the release of all medical, psychological, and psychiatric records to the
multidisciplinary team for the purpose of evaluation and prosecution under
the Act.
Where the multidisciplinary team relies on mental health records
promulgated by agencies of other states, issues of full faith and credit are
also likely to arise.21 4 While the Full Faith and Credit Clause does apply to
legislative enactments," 5 it "does not compel 'a state to substitute the

208. The United States Supreme Court recently found that the absence of language in a
statute elaborating retroactivity, even where such absence cannot realistically be attributed to
oversight or to unawareness of the retroactivity issue, is not dispositive. See Martin v. Hadix, 527
U.S. 343, 357-58 (1999).
209. A statute is remedial if designed to correct an existing law, redress an existing
grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 896
(6th ed. 1991).
210. Metropolitan Dade County v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So. 2d 494, 500 n.9 (Fla.
1999); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994); Cebrian v. Klein, 614 So.
2d 1209, 1211 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that "regardless of whether the statute is procedural or
substantive in nature, if a statute is remedial it must be applied retrospectively to serve its
intended purpose").
211. Chase, 737 So. 2d at 500 n.9.
212. See Manocchio v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1542 (1Ith Cir. 1992) (finding that where
legislative intent of a statutory provision was to protect the public, the sanction was remedial, not
punitive). Furthermore, any uncertainty as to the legislative intent should be resolved by an
interpretation that best accords with the public benefit. See Sunshine State News Co. v. State, 121
So. 2d 705, 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).
213. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 12, at 1.
214. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
215. See Bradford Electric Light Co., v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1932). Bradford has
been said to have been impliedly overruled by Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). See Shelby
Mut. Ins. Co., v. Girard Steel Supply Co., 224 F. Supp. 690,697 n.7 (D.C. Minn. 1963). Modern
choice of law methodologies dictate that where a state statutory policy conflicts with that of
another state, the conflict is to be solved by appraising and weighing the governmental interests
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statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter
concerning which it is competent to legislate.' 216 Accordingly, because the
Jimmy Ryce Act specifically allows for the release of all medical,
psychological, and psychiatric records to the multidisciplinary team for the
purposes of evaluation and prosecution under the Act, 21 v the Full Faith and

Credit Clause does not compel Florida to substitute the statutes of other
states for the Jimmy Ryce Act provisions.
Even if the 1998 Act did not specifically allow for release of otherwise
confidential records, Florida law would still apply. A state need not apply
another state's law in violation of its own legitimate public policy or where
giving effect to the foreign law would prejudice the state's own rights or
the rights of its citizens.2"' Because the Jimmy Ryce Act expresses
Florida's strong public policy interest in remedying a threat to the public,' 9
application of a conflicting foreign statute would most likely be found to
prejudice
the rights of Florida citizens and to contravene Florida public
220
policy.

of each jurisdiction, including whether the law in question violates the public policy or positive
law of the forum state or whether a state's giving effect to the foreign law would prejudice the
state's own rights or the rights of its citizens. See Donald W. Price, Comment, A Choice Of Law
Analysis ofEvidentiaryPrivileges, 50 LA. L. REv. 157, 162-64 (1989).
216. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939).
217. See FLA. STAT. § 394.913(2).
218. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) (citing Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 306
U.S. at 501).
219. The Florida Legislature found that
a small but extremely dangerous number of sexually violent predators exist who
...generally have antisocial personality features which are unamenable to
existing mental illness treatment modalities, and those features render them
likely to engage in criminal, sexually violent behavior. The Legislature further
[found] that the likelihood of sexually violent predators engaging in repeat acts
of predatory sexual violence is high. . . . It is therefore the intent of the
Legislature to create a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and
treatment of sexually violent predators.

FLA. STAT. § 916.31 (Supp. 1998).
220. Nonetheless, public policy of other states may similarly support disclosure of records
under the Jimmy Ryce Act. For example, under North Carolina law, a court determining
admissibility of confidential information must identify and balance various public and private
interests, particularly privacy interests, the benefit to psychotherapy or society of encouraging the
mentally disturbed to seek help, and the public's interest in fair administration of justice. See
Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576, 578-80 (M.D.N.C. 1978). North Carolina courts have
considered the interests involved in involuntary commitment proceedings and have found:

2000]
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In conclusion, the rationale for the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
to benefit society by encouraging disclosure to psychotherapists and by
protecting privacy. For this purpose to be served, "the participants in the
confidential conversation 'must be able to predict with some degree of
' 221
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.'
Furthermore, a party must first establish a reasonable probability that the
privileged matters contain necessary and material information.222 The
Jimmy Ryce Act eliminates such protections with broad and unconditional
exceptions to a respondent's confidentiality privilege.
VII. PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS ON CHALLENGES TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT

The avenues available to an individual who seeks to challenge the Act's
constitutionality are limited by the nature ofthe Jimmy Ryce Act's potential
constitutional infirmities. An inmate may dispute either the facial 223 or as-

[tihere are two humanitarian purposes of the involuntary commitment
proceedings. Fundamentally, the state is attempting to temporarily withdraw
from society those persons whose mental state is such that their presence may
pose a danger to society or to themselves. Secondly, the state is providing
treatment to those individuals who may not otherwise have the wisdom or the
wherewithal to seek it themselves. We are, therefore, examining a hybrid
proceeding which although involves a deprivation of liberty, the very purpose of
that deprivation is not solely to protect society but also has as a purpose the
protection, treatment, and aid of an individual who cannot or will not protect
himself.
French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (M.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd, 443 U.S. 901 (1979); see
also Belk v. North Carolina, 420 S.E.2d 682, 684-85 (1992) (finding that although North Carolina
involuntary commitment statutes have been amended since the French decision, the old and new
statutes essentially set out the same procedures for involuntary commitment); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT

OF LAWS

§ 139(2) (1971) (stating that evidence shall be admissible

"unless there is some special reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be given
effect.").
221. Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 393 (1981).
222. See State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
223. As a general rule, the question of the facial constitutionality of a statute is a question
of law for the court. See, e.g., Dutton Phosphate Co. v. Priest, 65 So. 282, 284-86 (Fla. 1914);
Williams v. Spears, 719 So. 2d 1238, 1238-42 (Fla. Ist DCA 1998). Furthermore, "a defendant
who only establishes that the statute 'might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable
set of circumstances' fails to demonstrate that the statute is wholly invalid." State v. Barnes, 686
So. 2d 633, 637 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1996) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1989)); see also Fieldhouse v. Public Health Trust, 374 So. 2d 476, 478 (Fla. 1979) (explaining
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applied constitutionality of the statute. An as-applied challenge could
conceivably arise where an inmate argues that his petition should be
dismissed because certain conditions of his confinement were
unconstitutional.224 However, while Florida law would allow a facial
challenge in a circuit court proceeding, it would generally proscribe an asapplied challenge unless "the party seeking to bypass usual administrative
channels can demonstrate that no adequate remedy remains available under
'
[the Florida Administrative Procedures Act]."225
As a rule, a circuit court is authorized to enjoin administrative action
only if an agency proposes to act without any colorable legal authority.226
Generally, an agency acts without legal authority ifthe statute it implements
is either facially unconstitutional, or plainly has no application, however
construed, and then only if irreparable injury is threatened. 22"In Key Haven
AssociatedEnterprisesv. Boardof Trustees,228 the Florida Supreme Court
clarified the appropriate role of the circuit court where constitutional
challenges have been raised in the context of the administrative decisionmaking process of an executive agency.229 Ifthe statute being implemented
by an agency is claimed to be facially unconstitutional, 3 the circuit court
may, when appropriate, entertain a declaratory action on the statute's facial
validity. 231' Likewise, the facial validity of a statutory scheme as set forth
the Florida Administrative Code may be
in the Florida Statutes and 232
court.
circuit
a
in
challenged

that it is not the duty of the court "to envision theoretical combinations of factors which, if present,
might render a statute unconstitutional;" rather it is the court's responsibility to "examine the facts
as they exist and resolve all doubts as to the validity of a statute infavor of its constitutionality.").
224. See In re Detention of Campbell, 986 P. 2d 771, 773 * I (Wash. 1999) (en banc).
225. See Gulf Pines Mem'l Park, Inc., v. Oakland Mem'l Park, Inc., 361 So. 2d 695, 699
(Fla. 1978).
226. See id.

227. Florida Marine Fisheries Comm'n v. Pringle, 736 So. 2d 17, 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
228. 427 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1982).
229. See id. at 157.
230. A legislative enactment is facially invalid only "if it cannot be applied constitutionally
to any factual situation." Voce v. State, 457 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Moreover,
under a facial challenge, when a court can reach its result without resorting to constitutional
grounds, it should do so. See State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997). However, where
"the 'other grounds' do not favor the party raising the constitutional issues, ... it is necessary for
the court to determine whether or not the challenged statute or ordinance is constitutional."
Curless v. County of Clay, 395 So. 2d 255, 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
231. Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 157.
232. See Butler v. State, Dep't of Ins., 680 So. 2d 1103, 1106 (Fla. ist DCA 1996).
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In contrast, where an inmate claims that an agency has applied 3 a
facially constitutional statute or rule in such a way that the aggrieved
inmate's constitutional rights have been violated, administrative remedies
must first be exhausted and then "the district courts provide a proper forum
to resolve this type of constitutional challenge."' Generally, a claim of asapplied unconstitutionality of a facially constitutional statute involves the
assertion of an actual violation of an inmate's rights.235 Consequently,
where an inmate claims unconstitutionality of a statute both facially and asapplied, the trial court may be the proper forum for resolution of the facial
constitutional question, while as to the as-applied constitutional challenge,
the inmate may be required to exhaust his or her available administrative
remedies.236
Accordingly, circuit courts are an inappropriate forum to address
allegations that the Jimmy Ryce Act is unconstitutional as applied to a
certain inmate. 2" First, such allegations are premature because unless and
until an inmate is found to be a sexually violent predator, and committed
233. "It is a well-recognized principle of law that a statute or ordinance may be valid as
applied to one set of facts, though invalid in its application to another set of facts." Exparte Wise,
192 So. 872, 875 (Fla. 1940). Incidentally, under Florida double jeopardy analysis, "where the
legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, the court inquires into whether
the statutory scheme on its face is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate that
intention." See State v. Bowling, 712 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
234. See Key Haven, 427 So. 2d at 157-58.
235. See id at 158. For example, in Key Haven, the Court explained that
[t]his type of challenge would involve the assertion that an agency's
implementing action was improper because, for example, the agency denied the
party the rights to due process or equal protection. A suit in the circuit court
requesting that court to declare an agency's action improper because of such a
constitutional deficiency in the administrative process should not be allowed.
Id
236. See Chrysler Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 720 So. 2d
563, 567-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). In Chrysler, Chrysler, during the pendency of D.O.A.H.
proceedings, filed a complaint in the circuit court against the Department seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief from an alleged violation of Chrysler's constitutional rights. See id at 567.
Chrysler challenged the constitutionality of Florida statutory provisions, both facially and as
applied. See id.After the trial court granted a Department's motion to dismiss, the Court of
Appeals reversed and concluded that the trial court was the proper forum under Key Haven for
resolution of the facial constitutional question because if Chrysler was correct that the statute is
unconstitutional on its face, "then the extraordinary relief of a declaratory judgment is justified
before Chrysler is required to incur the expense of litigating in the administrative forum to
determine if this proposed modification is unfair or otherwise prohibited." Id at 568. However,
regarding the as-applied constitutional challenge, the Court of Appeals concluded "that the trial
court correctly ruled that Chrysler must exhaust its available administrative remedies," and
accordingly affirmed that portion of the final judgment of dismissal. Id.
237. See generally Williams v. Spears, 719 So. 2d 1238, 1239-42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
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under the provisions of the Act, "the constitutionality of the statute as
applied to the facts of his case cannot be determined." 238 Second, even if
the claims are not premature, administrative remedies must first be
exhausted and then the district courts provide a proper forum to resolve
this type of constitutional challenge.
In addition, other forums may be available to inmates subject to Jimmy
Ryce Act proceedings.239 For example, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
of Florida, granted an inmate's petition for writ of habeas corpus in a
Jimmy Ryce Act proceeding because the inmate was detained after he
completed his sentence without receiving an adversarial probable cause
hearing.24 ° The court found that a confinement under such circumstances
violated procedural due process and ordered the petitioner released unless
a probable cause hearing was held within five days. 24' However, habeas
corpus petitions may not be an effective remedy for the substantive due
process issues addressed in this note because the "purpose of a writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of a prisoner's present
detention," not the substantive constitutional infirmities of the judicial
process.242
VIII. CONCLUSION

The Jimmy Ryce Act illustrates what can go wrong when a tragic event
leads to sweeping legislation.243 Clearly, the State of Florida has the right
to protect, through legislation, its citizens from sexual violence, but the
Act, as it is applied does not reasonably further that purpose. In fact, the
law may not even have applied to the man who killed Jimmy Ryce.244 While
the state may legitimately involuntarily commit those who are truly mentally
ill and dangerous, determining these two factors is difficult and inherently
ambiguous. Hence, the Florida Legislature must take care not to deprive
individuals of liberty on the basis of public sentiment. Instead, it should
ensure that safeguards are securely in place to guarantee minimization of
errors in the involuntary commitment process.
However, the 1999 amendments to the Act do exactly the opposite,
removing the few barriers against misinterpretation that may easily result
from the ambiguity inherent in determining mental abnormality and
predicting dangerousness. As a result, the Florida Legislature should
238. In re Detention of McClatchey, 940 P.2d 646, 647-48 (Wash. 1997).
239. See Valdez v. Moore, 745 So. 2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

240. See id.
241. See id.
242. State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Schreiber, 561 So. 2d 1236, 124.0 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1990).
243. See Opinion, Watch For Collisions,PALM-BEACH POST, Feb. 25, 2000, at 16A.
244. See id.
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reconsider restricting the procedural safeguards provided to inmates by the
rules ofevidence and civil procedure. At a minimum, additional safeguards
should be implemented to ensure that predictions by the multidisciplinary
team are based upon adequate evidentiary foundations. Given the
ambiguities and due process concerns of indefinite involuntary commitment,
the Florida Legislature should also explore long-term alternatives to the
Jimmy Ryce Act, such as providing longer prison terms, stricter probation
periods, and improved treatment for convicted sex offenders.245

245. See id.

